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The dispute initiators of the GATT and the WTO:  
lessons for the future to improve accessibility, sustainability, and relevancy of the WTO 
 
 




The dispute initiators of the WTO and its predecessor the GATT play important role in 
keeping this institution relevant as the act of dispute initiation show the extent of active use of 
the system by its members to maintain the objective of the WTO. This paper investigates the 
use of dispute settlement by the members in terms of dispute initiations with the help of a 
newly compiled database that allows easier comparison between the dispute initiators during 
the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT. The exploratory results are based on the descriptive 
analysis that show the increasing number of disputes against the lower-income countries 
indicating their integration into the global trade system. The results reveal patterns, which 
show strong ties to the income of the members and other dimensions contributing to bilateral 
trade. This implies among others that the richer members with the US in the lead do not only 
initiate more disputes, but also get confronted with more number of disputes. The 
transformation from diplomacy-oriented GATT to the rule-oriented WTO has maintained this 
pattern. This result is clashing to the purpose of the procedurally sophisticated and legally 
refined WTO that was designed to improve access to all members. These are a few clear 
indications of the needed changes in the dispute settlement. The possible areas of 
modifications in the existing structure could be the in the broadening role of third-party, the 
digitization and extension of services of advisory council on WTO law. The paper makes case 
for these reforms, which may contribute to enhance the inclusiveness and help the WTO to 
become time relevant to serve its members better.  
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Introduction 
The formative years of the second half of the 1940s saw a rise in a few vital 
international institutions like the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
The one institution that would change the economic life of the citizens in the member 
countries was unquestionably the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), a treaty 
which was signed by 23 countries2 in 1948 establishing a multilateral agreement, the GATT. 
The contracting parties of the GATT continued to meet, negotiate and improve upon the 
system. Incorporating the GATT experience in the process of a gradual transformation from 
the GATT to the new multilateral organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), was a 
complicated, hard and a delicate work that took several negotiation rounds3 spread over a few 
decennia to put forward a landmark in the multilateral international economic law which a 
resulted in a comprehensive, more accessible multilateral organization to cater the need for all 
member countries, including those with lesser economic power.  
Over the years the membership of the WTO continued to rise, from 128 at the onset of 
the in 1995 to 1644 members as of December 2019 covering 98% of the total world trade. The 
WTO covers the global rules of trade among the member countries strives to ensure free, 
smooth, predictable flow of trade. It is this global trade regime across the members, 
irrespective of the economic status, striven by the WTO that has made this institution as the 
bearer of the character of the global public good by Kaul(2001)5.  
To be relevant and inclusive removing the bottlenecks of the GATT system was 
important and the transformation brought a rule-oriented dispute settlement rather than 
diplomacy oriented GATT system of dispute settlement. This formalization was expected to 
 
2 23 countries engaging in the Geneva negotiations that led to the signing of the GATT in 1947 were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma 
(Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovakia), France, India, Lebanon, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Syria, United Kingdom, and 
United States(WTO & History, 2018). It should be noted that only 18 of these countries were the members during the year 1948. Chile joined 
in 1949.  Lebanon, Syria, China did not join the GATT. While  China joined under the WTO in 2001 Lebanon and Syria are in accession 
process. Czechoslovakia joined in 1993 as two separate GATT members namely the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
3 The scope of GATT also widened: during 1948-1967 it encompassed only tariffs, between 1968-1978 it included tariffs and anti-dumping. 
From 1979-1994 it included: tariffs non-tariff measures, and “framework” agreements and in 1995 with the establishment of  the WTO it 
encompassed trade in goods and, services, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). 
 
4 A list of all the members with the date of accession is provided in appendix 1. 
5 Global public goods (GPG) can be characterized as multi-level process, requiring policy action at the national, regional and global levels. It 
involves input at international level but the domestically executed  policy initiatives undertaken, by several nations. No single nation, 
however powerful, can produce these goods on its own. An adequate provisioning of GPGs is ever-more important to development. The 
development cooperation and international cooperation in support of GPGs, irrespective of the status of the members are closely intertwined. 
The preferences for GPGs, as well as various aspects of development, vary across countries. These divergences call for measures of 
‘incentive tipping’ in order to align countries. For more reading refer to discussion papers of German Development institute by Kaul (1999, 
2001). 
lower the threshold for the less powerful members to initiate disputes (Zahran 1995; Bown 
2004a). In other words, the number of disputes initiated by the low income countries should 
increase under the WTO. 
Accordingly, the central question is formulated as: Who are the initiators of the GATT 
and WTO? The answer to the question also unfolds the effect of the formalization of the DSU 
procedure in terms of the dispute initiations by the poorer members of the WTO with respect 
to the GATT. Additionally, it provides the stylized features of bilateral pairs in a dispute with 
the help of a few selected political and economic dimensions during the period of 1948 to 
2016 with the help of a newly compiled dataset that facilitates the comparison between the 
GATT and the WTO dispute initiations.  
A quick look in the data shows that while in 1948 there was only one dispute across 
the continents, the onset of the WTO illustrates that it is not only the number of filed disputes 
that has gone up but also the dispersion of the disputes across the WTO members and the 
continents. This dispersion across the members is a key point as it evidences the increased 
accessibility of the WTO to its members which could be a consequence of the transformation 
from the GATT to the WTO that is commensurate with the formalization of the Dispute 
Settlement Unit (DSU). Moreover, the GATT/ WTO is a member-driven organization and 
that makes the aspect of accessibility to all of the members essential in order to ensure its 
success and sustainability (Baldwin & Nakatomi, 2015). The increasing number of disputes 
shows that they continue to be the instrument in force for the members to safeguard their own 
trade interests. This makes the members’ role6 as the dispute initiator7 of utmost importance 
because it is the most active role that a country can play to safeguard its own trade interests. 
After all, the countries join the WTO because its major advantage is that it is the organization 
that has trade and trade-related policies at its centre (Bown and Hoekman, 2004). 
 
A unique of its kind the dispute settlement of the WTO refined the legal procedures in 
various directions and areas. The defendant8 was no longer protected owing to requirement of 
 
6 A member country may participate in the DSB in various roles, for example, as a complainant, respondent, third parties, panel member, and 
appellate body members. 
7It should be noted that the dispute initiation is just the first step. It is the settlement of the dispute that matters to a dispute initiating country. 
A dispute can be settled in several ways, which is out of scope for this paper. For now, it suffices to say that all  GATT disputes for which 
panel reports were adopted are considered as settled and otherwise. During the WTO, a dispute is considered be settled when a respondent 
country has complied with panel ruling, or when a dispute has a mutually agreed solution.  
 
8 The role of a respondents is a reactive role because it needs to defend itself after it faces a complaint. The role of a third-party is an induced 
active role because a country that is interested in participating as a third-party needs to provide evidence of substantial interest in the case, 
but this role does not involve complicated procedures or substantial costs.  
positive consensus. The WTO tackled this issue by employing the requirement of negative 
consensus9. This was to do away with the influence of powerful rich nations. The rule-bound, 
time stipulated procedure was expected to make the dispute settlement system more 
accessible to lower-income countries. Though the differences between the GATT and the 
WTO are numerous, this paper limits itself to the key differences necessary from the point of 
view of a member country, and hence potentially a dispute initiator10. The reason for the 
emphasize will be clear as we move further in this section, which shows that the role of a 
dispute initiator is the most active role that keeps the DSU running for a greater good of trade 
with a minimum and or transparent barriers. 
The main purpose of the GATT is to strengthen international trade. The GATT 
members were designated as the contracting parties. The scope of the GATT was mainly listed 
to trade in goods. The main purpose of the WTO, that was established in 1995, is to govern 
GATT and international trade practices. It also marked a widening of scope from tariff to 
other non-monetary measures subjects. A dispute initiating member country during the GATT 
had to file a dispute to a permanent appellate body. This body was expected to review findings 
of the panel and settle disputes, but there was no permanent structure or framework. The 
method employed was diplomatic and a full consensus was required. Moreover, the nature of 
the procedure was Ad-Hoc without any fixed time path. The procedural power base was more 
biased towards the defendant, which could veto ratification procedure in order to avoid 
complying with the findings of the panel. 
Gal-Edd (1961) titled his book on GATT as “Is GATT a Rich Man’s Club?”. He 
concludes his book by providing an affirmative answer to the question asked in the title of the 
book. The use of GATT by the rich nations was acknowledged and measures to do away with 
power were taken and are reflected in the DSU procedures of the WTO. The essence of this 
change can be captured in one statements from the speech on the eve of the WTO era, “As we 
now move away from the GATT into the WTO, all partners have undertaken to comply with a 
strengthened rule-based system” (Chair of the GATT, Mr. Zahran, WTO 1995).  
 
 
9  The dispute settlement board (DSB) is the administrative body of the dispute settlement unit (DSU) establishes panels, when it adopts the 
reports of panel and Appellate Body  and  authorizes retaliation, the DSB must approve the decision unless there is a consensus against it 
(Articles 6.1, 16.4, 17.14 and 22.6 of the DSU). This special decision-making procedure is commonly referred to as “negative” or “reverse” 
consensus (section 3.1 www.wto.org). 
10 For a more detailed in-depth differences between the GATT and the WTO refer to  WIDER, WP 195 (2000),. Crowley (2003) and the 
WTO website. 
The WTO member countries join the WTO and take voluntarily an obligation to 
contribute to the stability of a global economy by following rules that govern the external and 
internal trade policy and contribute to fulfil the main function of the WTO. The main function 
of the WTO is to maintain trade flow that is running as smoothly, predictably and freely as 
possible. The WTO is thus of vital importance and potential key player toward global 
governance (Lamy, 2005)11.The WTO provides the necessary facilities that ensure global 
governance on trade matters(WTO, 2014). Any detected breach or deviation from the 
GATT/WTO rules can be disputed at the DSU. This makes the DSU central pillar of the 
WTO. A trade dispute is a vital instrument for enforcing the WTO rules to ensure the flow of 
trade runs smoothly among the member countries. A dispute at the DSU, thus functions as a 
signal to the WTO, where a complainant country notifies an exact breach of a rule by another 
country, a respondent country. Subsequently, the DSU helps to rectify the breach through a 
panel ruling. That makes the DSU a heart of the WTO system. A dispute imitating country 
plays a vital role as it provides a signal through disputes to regulate the world trade system by 
initiating a procedure to remove the obstacles to keep the trade flowing.  
The WTO has a permanent structure with a permanent framework, the secretariat 
being an institutional backbone and serving as an institutional memory. It maintains a list of 
potential panel members submitted by the member countries and proposes nominations for the 
panel to the disputants. Its scope is wider than the GATT, which dealt only with trade in 
goods. The WTO rules include trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights.  
Place in the literature: 
There is ample literature about the participation of the WTO members in the DSU (Horn, 
Mavroidis, & Nordström, 1999; Shaffer, 2003; Bown, 2004; Horn, Johannesson, & 
Mavroidis, 2011). In addition, there are yearly reports by the WTO and regular publications of 
statistical analyses by Leitner and Lester (2007, 2011). To this date, however, it remains 
unclear to what extent the participation of the members has increased under the WTO with 
respect to the GATT and whether it has been able to increase the participation of the low-
income countries as dispute initiators over the years. One of the reasons for this could be that 
 
11 Mr. Lamy the Director General,  WTO in 2005 retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl12_e.htm 
most of the studies and reports12 analyze the member countries according to their 
development status and hence fails to allow making a strict distinction between the low- and 
high-income countries13.  
This paper deviates from earlier studies in several aspects. Firstly, the paper extends the 
period of investigation (from 1948 to 2016) which allows the comparability between the 
GATT period and the WTO period. Secondly, deviating from large parts of previous literature 
on the participation of the members in the DSU, the paper employs a World Bank (WB) 
analytical income classification that allows considering the changes in the income status of 
the members over the years14. Lastly, the paper uses rich, self-compiled data that are arranged 
by complainant-respondent-year-dispute quadruplet15.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.1 describes the self-
compiled dataset on disputes that were initiated during the GATT and the WTO period from 
1948 to 2016. Section 1.2 describes data and a few selected dimensions for the stylized 
features such as economic integration and the political system. Section 1.3 presents the 
stylized features of the disputes data. Finally, Section 1.4 discusses the results and concludes.  
  
 
12 The periodical reports by Leitner & Lester take into account disputes from 1995 onwards and do not  assess the participation in terms of 
income status. 
13 The WTO does not have its own definition; the UN publishes the list of countries with development status. Strictly speaking, the term 
developing countries includes not only low-income countries but also high-income countries like Brunei and upper-middle income countries 
like Brazil. This paper does not focus on the definition of developing countries, as such, but on countries’ classification as low-income 
countries and lower- middle-income countries.  This is an advantage in the sense that a country’s income classification is objective, whereas 
countries’ self-reported claims regarding their development status may be (geo)politically motivated. 
14 For example, until 2007 India was classified  as a low-income country, after which it was graduated to the status of  lower-middle income 
country. Brazil, classified as Upper-middle income country for most of the period,  has seen a change in income status to lower-middle 
income country, for example during 2003-2005.   
15 Data arranged by complainant-respondent helps to analyse the by country-pairs, as the trade relations and trade-flows are bilateral. 
 
















Text Box:1.1 A dispute case by Sri Lanka 
Coconut is one of the major plantation crops in Sri Lanka and accounts for approximately 12% of all agricultural 
produce there. With a total land area under cultivation of approximately 395,000 hectares, which is equivalent to 
about 2,500 million nuts are per year, coconut is clearly a product of commercial importance for this island. This is 
the most important reason why Sri Lanka showed interest toward reserving the rights as a third party when, on 27 
November 1995, the Philippines requested consultations with Brazil in respect of a countervailing duty imposed by 
Brazil on the Philippines’ exports of desiccated coconut. The Philippines claimed that the Brazilian duty was 
inconsistent with WTO and GATT rules (DS 22). Subsequently, on 23 February 1996, Sri Lanka filed a similar but 
separate complaint against Brazil by requesting consultations with Brazil concerning imposition of countervailing 
duties on Sri Lanka’s export of desiccated coconut and coconut milk powder. Sri Lanka alleged that those measures 
are inconsistent with GATT Articles I, II,  and VI and Article 13(a) of the Agriculture Agreement (DS 30). 
At the DSB, every dispute is treated as a separate case, and the ruling of one case does not automatically 
apply to the other party. The settlement of the DSB is binding on the WTO member countries, though it is of self-
enforcing nature. In this light, the decision of Sri Lanka to file a separate complaint could be considered as being 
rational. These two dispute cases are unique mainly because they are filed by the countries that are economically 
developing. 
As far as the outcomes of these two cases are concerned, the case filed by Sri Lanka (DS 30)at the WTO 
has a current official status of ‘in consultation’ implying that it is still not settled. On the other hand, the dispute case 
of the Philippines is resolved (DS22); the status is that the Report(s) has been adopted and no further action is 
required.  
(Based on information on the cases from the WTO website) 
 
1.2) Data and rationale of dimensions 
This paper intends to ascertain the effect of the formalization of the DSU procedure in terms 
of the dispute initiations by the poorer members of the WTO with respect to the GATT. 
Additionally, it provides stylized features of bilateral pairs in a dispute with the help of a few 
selected economic and political dimensions during the period of 1948 to 2016. This section 
provides information about the data the data and discusses the rationale and dimensions that 
are used to describe features of bilateral pairs. 
 
1.2.1) The data on disputes 
  
The disputes under the GATT date from 1 January 1948 to 31 December 1994. The 13216 
recorded cases by Hudec17 include those during the transitional period from the GATT to the 
WTO18. The splitting of the EU into bilateral cases gives rise to 735 bilateral GATT disputes. 
The disputes under the WTO date from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2016. The WTO 
dataset covers all 518 disputes that were initiated through the official filing of a request for 
consultations at the WTO. The 518 cases, when split bilaterally and considering the EU as one 
entity, totals 548 disputes. The splitting of the EU into bilateral dispute cases gives rise to 
4024 bilateral WTO disputes. Table 1.1 summarizes the total number of dispute records.  
The data used in this paper is a part of the self-compiled database. A user’s manual of 
dataset will be provided in Web Appendix19. Though the newly compiled dataset bilaterally 
splits all of the disputes, the descriptive analysis in this paper considers not only the bilateral 
pairs but also the uniquely initiated disputes. The reason for this is that the EU files disputes 
as one economic entity and defends them as one respondent20. The EU cases at the DSU are 
not considered as cases of multiple disputants. The unit of analysis in this paper, therefore, is 
at the economic entity level. Practically, it means that the participation of the countries at the 
DSU of the GATT and the WTO is determined at the country-pair level except for the EU. 
This because the EU files the disputes and fends the dispute against it as one economic entity. 
 
16 The three GATT cases coded as DSG 97, DSG 99, and DSG 102, Job Development Tax Credit, Border Tax Adjustments and UK – 
Temporary Import Charges are not the bilateral complaints but GATT examinations and do not have the dispute relevant data. They are 
included in the database but are irrelevant for the dispute case analysis. 
17 Robert E. Hudec is considered as the founding father of international economic law. He was the first to compile the data on GATT disputes 
which are publicly and available on the websites of world trade law and the WTO. The date of his database compilation is uncited on either 
sites. 
18 Using the twofold arguments about the consistency of the source and emphasizing on a cleaner break from the GATT to the WTO era, 
Maggi and Staiger (2013) choose to exclude the cases during the transitional period from 1990 to 1995 from the analysis. DS3, DS16, DS52, 
DS101, DS106, DS185, DS228, DS271, as they are handled in DS41, DS27, DS65, DS132, DS126, DS187, DS230, DS270, respectively. 
The case DS 152, which is the same as DS16, DS27 is considered for a reason that is not known. 
19 User’s manual is Work in progress 
20 This also helps to give an ‘unbiased’ picture of the income status of the disputants. Most of the EU members are classified as high-income 
countries. Greece, that joined the EU in 1981, was classified as an upper middle-income (UM) country until 1995. At present, there are only 
two countries, viz. Bulgaria and Romania that joined the EU in 2007, that are classified as UM countries by the World Bank. 
The complied data are country-pair level. This allows that, when the analysis considers the 
dimensions such as the contiguity and the political system, the data at country-pair level 
becomes handy. The EU disputes are split into bilateral-pair level and that gives a count of 
473021 disputes.  
Table 1.1: Number of dispute records  
Era Years Recorded disputes Bilateral cases (with the 
EU as one entity) 
Bilateral cases (with EU 
split) 
GATT 1 January 1948 - 31 December 1994 132 177 735 
WTO 1 January 1995 - 31 December 2016 518 548 4024 
  




This paper uses a few selected dimensions to provide an insight into the characteristics of 
dispute initiators under the WTO with respect to the GATT. The WTO deals with trade and 
the DSU disputes are related the breach of trade rules, therefore the use oftrade contributing 
factors for the analysis is obvious. The use of income-status and other geo-political 
dimensions find the rationale in the standard gravity model of bilateral trade22. The 
dimensions in the gravity model vary from economic to geo-political factors (Head & Mayer, 
2013b). Research has shown a clear positive relationship between GDP and rule of law 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). It is common in the WTO literature to use the gross 
domestic product (GDP) or other derived dimensions like the GDP per capita23 as a proxy for 
the legal capacity of a country (Horn et.al. 1999; Bown, 2005). The skewed use of the DSU 
by high-income countries was ascribed to the high export intensity of the high-income by 
Horn et.al (1999).  
Accordingly, the paper uses the World Bank classification of countries into four 
income categories, which is explained in Table 1.2. Though such a classification24 is based on 
 
21 The number is smaller than the total of 4759 due to the availability of the data. 
22 It essentially explains (the natural logarithm of) trade with (the logs of) the distance between the countries and their joint income. This 
basic model is often augmented in the literature with some extra conditioning dimensions that affect trade. These dimensions account for as 
many extraneous factors as possible, for example, the historical connection or the location of a country (Head & Mayer, 2013a) – update this 
reference 
23 Data source:  GDP per capita by Maddison http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm.and the merchandise export share, 
pwt (9.0) http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt;  
24 This classification line is adjusted yearly; for example, for the year 2013, all of the countries with per capita income <= $1,045 were 
labelled as L, the countries with the per capita income range between $1,046-$4,125 and $4,126-$12,745 were classified as LM and UM, 
respectively, whereas all of the countries that enjoyed per capita income >$12,745 were classified as H. The World Bank provides 
classification for the years from 1987 to 2012. For the years prior to 1987, the classification of 1987 is taken as the reference year whereas, 
for the years from 2013-2016, the year 2012 is taken as the reference year. Every year, the World Bank publishes the categorization of the 
countries by gross national income per capita. The analytical classification of the World Bank (GNI per capita in US$ Atlas methodology) 
income, it still indicates more than just a numerical cut-off line25. Another way of classifying 
the member countries is based on deciles of income. The deciles sort the data into ten equal 
parts. A higher place in the decile ranking denotes higher income. 
 Apart from the income-classification, the paper also classifies the member countries 
into the continents26. Accordingly, the countries are divided as they appear in the World 
Atlas27. Additionally, a complainant country can be contiguous to the respondent country or 
otherwise. This is captured with a dyadic dimension contiguity. The data on contiguity is 
drawn from Mayer & Zignago (2011). Their data is also a source of the data on colonization.  
Another dimension that is considered is the extent of economic agreement between the 
bilateral pairs. During the GATT period alone, the number of notified regional trade 
agreements (RTA) amounted to 124 and, since the WTO, the number of notifications has 
increased to 400 (RTA-IS, 2017)28. The use of a tariff rate can be justified on the grounds that 
most of the 20th century regional and multilateral agreements focussed on tariffs and other 
border measures (Baldwin, 2014). An additional reason for the use of tariff rates is owed to 
the most fruitful result of the Uruguay round, namely, the commitment of the member 
countries to cut the tariff rate29 and to “bind” custom duty rates to levels that are difficult to 
raise (WTO, 2017). However, it should be noted that the import tariffs in developed countries 
tend to be lower than in developing countries (WTO, 2017)30. The bilateral dataset on an 
economic integration agreement is drawn from the publicly accessible Bergstrand (2017)31, 
and the data on tariff rates are drawn from the World Bank Economic Indicators (2017).  
The rationale for political dimensions is rooted in the theory of structure of trade 
protection that links the political contribution of the lobbyists to the trade policy (Grossman, 
and Helpman, 2007). Furthermore, a national government is the only entity that is allowed to 
file a dispute at the WTO hence an internal dimension, such as the political system, is 
 
provides information from the year 1987. During this period, some of the countries have moved upwards in the income classification. For the 
same country, it is not possible to allocate more than one income status, so the final income status of the countries as of 1994 for the GATT 
cases and as of 2014 for the WTO cases is taken. To give an idea about the countries with an L status that complained under the GATT: 
Cuba, Malawi, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe. Under the WTO, Bangladesh, Honduras India, Indonesia, Nicaragua Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka.  
25 Another relevant justification to use the GDP is the positive but statistically non-significant relationship between the relative contribution 
of non-tariff measures to the overall level of protection and the level of GDP per capita (World Trade Report 2012).  
 
26 There could have been other criterion for the classification based on the regional proximity like the Middle –East or free trade zone like 
NAFTA. However, the extent of the cooperation and economic integration differs and, to provide an overview of the distribution of the 
disputes across the continents, the geographical location serves the purpose. 
27 Geographically, North-America includes the central American countries. The number in brackets show the number of countries in each of 
the continents as published in December 2014 on educational resources website world atlas. Africa (54) Asia (44), Australia Oceania (14), 
Europe (47), North America (23), and South America (12) of which 42, 33, 8, 42, 22, 12 countries are the WTO members, respectively. 
http://www.worldatlas.com/cntycont.htm 
28 Regional trade agreement information system (RTA-IS) of the WTO . Accessed October 2017. 
29 Tariff is the duty that is charged on imports, and the most visible indicator of protectionism is the tariff data. 
30 Paper 6: Developing countries: How the WTO deals with the special needs of an increasingly important group, 
31 The dataset indexes the amount of trade openness on a scale from one to six between every country pair between 1950 and 2012. 
The source of ranking of Economic Integration Agreement(EIA) https://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/ 
essential to characterize the dispute initiators. A political system represents the extent of 
influence of the citizens on the election of the head of the state. This essentially captures the 
relationship between the executive and legislative branch of the government and the 
competitiveness of elections of political actors (Cruz, Keefer, & Scartascini, 2016). Another 
political dimension relates to the form of democracy. The plurality form of democracy 
indicates a system of a majority-based election in a country. This form of democracy is 
supposed to be more susceptible to the majority mass opinion and is thereby subject to the 
disproportional influence of the local constituencies than is the system of proportional 
representation (Persson & Tabellini, 2004). The political data is drawn from the Database on 
Political Institutions (Keefer, 2012). The explanation of the used dimensions is placed in 
Table 1.2. The sources of all dimensions are summed up in the list of data sources after the 
references. 
Table 1.2: Dimensions and definitions 
Dimension Definition/ explanation  
Income 
classification 
four income categories: low-income countries (L), lower-middle-income countries (LM), upper middle-income 
countries (UM), and High-income countries (H) 
Deciles: The 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, 90th, and 100th percentiles. Considering the ten categories, the 
paper chooses to restrict, in most of the cases, to the World Bank classification of four categories 
Continent The complainant and respondent countries are divided into six continents: Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, 
Oceania, and South America 
Contiguity Whether the complainant and the respondent are the adjacent countries, 0= non-contiguous and 1= contiguous 
Colonization Whether the complainant and the respondent have ever been in colonial relations, 0= No and 1= ever in colonial 
relation  
Political system The political system of a complaining country indicates the power of the president through an election. The election 
of the president: direct/ electoral college=0, assembly elected=1, or parliamentary=2 




Rankings level of economic integration: 0 ="No Agreement", 
 1 =" Non-Reciprocal PTA", 2= "Preferential Trade Ag", 3= "Free Trade Agreement" 
 4 ="Customs Union", 5="Common Market" 
Tariff Tariff rate is the applied, simple mean of all products (%). The paper compares the tariff rate of a complainant with 
respect to the respondent. It assumes value =2 when a complainant has a higher tariff rate than the respondent, 0 





The purpose of this descriptive research was to ascertain the participation status of the 
members under the WTO (1995-2016) with respect to the GATT (1948-1994). This section 
presents the graphs and tables to illustrate the extent of participation before moving to the 
other dimensions such as the contiguity and the tariff.  
 
1.3.1 Number and extent of the participation  
 
Table 1.3 provides the information on the number of member countries that have ever 
participated in the dispute either as a complainant or as a respondent during the period under 
consideration. The first 4 columns show the participation of the member countries during the 
GATT period and the Columns (5)-(8) provide information about the participation during the 
WTO as complainants and respondents. The rows specify the role of a respondent or a non-
respondent. This gives rise to four quadrants, Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4. Quadrant 1(Q1) shows 
non-complainants and respondents; in other words, the quadrant shows induced active 
members. Quadrant 2 (Q2) indicates most active members, Quadrant 3 (Q3) shows 
complainants and non-respondents, i.e., dispute initiating members alone. Quadrant 4 (Q4) 
shows non-complainant and non-respondent members, i.e., the most passive members. The 
figures in parentheses indicates the number and percentage under the GATT. Q2 demonstrates 
that there are 34 countries that are the most active countries under the WTO while that 
number was 23 under the GATT. Q4 denotes that most of the countries under the WTO, 97 
out of 164 (59%) as of December 2016, have not participated in the disputes either as a 
complainant or as a respondent. Percentage wise, the number of passive members is fewer 
than under the GATT that counted 64.8% passive members.  
Table 1.3. Participants quadrant 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) Column (8) 
GATT As of December 
1994 
     WTO As of December 
2016 
    












GATT Respondents Q2: 23(17.9%) Q1: 7(5.3%) 30 WTO 
Respondents 
Q2: 34 (20.7%) Q1: 20 (12.2%) 54 
GATT Non 
Respondents 
Q3: 15(11.7%) Q4: 83(64.8%) 98 WTO Non 
Respondents 
Q3: 13 (7.9%) Q4: 97 (59.1%) 110 
Total 38 90 128 Total 47 117 164 
GATT Until December 1994, as per publicly available GATT records as of December 2016. For the WTO as of December 2016.    
Source: (Authors calculation) 
 
Table 1.4 lists the fifteen most frequent dispute initiators that belong to Q2 in a 
previous table. The first two columns show the participation of the members under the GATT. 
Columns 4, 5, and 6 depict the participation of the active countries under the WTO as 
complainants, respondent, and the third parties, respectively.  
Table 4 indicates that the first four frontrunners, viz. the US, the EU, Canada, and 
Brazil, during the GATT continue to maintain their active role during the WTO. Moreover, 
these frequent users of the DSU as the disputants also actively participate as a third party 
country. The number of cases in which the members participate as third party exceeds those 
for all of the countries.  
 
Table 1.4. Most active participant countries 
 















Total WTO cases 
as third-party  
United States  42 38 114 130 140 
European Union 
(formerly EC) 
19 28 97  84  166  
Canada 15 13 35 20  120  
Brazil 7 2 31 16 112 
Mexico 3 0 24 14 82 
India 1 1 23 24  128  
Japan 2 4 23 15  171  
Argentina 1 0 20 22  60  
Korea, Republic 
of 
0 4 17 16  113  
China N.A. N.A. 15 39  140  
Thailand 1 1 13 4  73  
Indonesia 0 0 10 14  21  
Chile 5 0 10 13 45 
Guatemala 3 0 9 2 37 
Russia N.A. N.A. 6 7 37 




1.3.2 Nature of participation and the Income status 
  
The WTO recognizes an additional role of third party32. The possibility of the member 
countries participating as a third party has enhanced the participation of all of the members. 
Table 1.5 depicts the number of countries according to income status and nature of 
participation of all of the members under the GATT (1948-1994) and WTO (1995-2016). It 
demonstrates the widespread use of participation in the role of a third party not only among 
the low-income countries but also among the members from other income categories. 
 
Table 1.6 answers the question ‘who complained against whom’ considering the 
income status of the complainant and the respondents. The first column shows the income 
status of the complaining countries while the second third, fourth, fifth columns indicate the 
L, LM, UM, and H income status of the respondent countries, respectively. The first part of 
Table 1.6 provides information related to the GATT, and the second part of the table provides 
the same information for the WTO. 
Under the GATT, 51% (90 out of 177) of the total disputes were those between high-
income countries. That percentage decreased to 36% (195 out of 548) under the WTO. While 
the lower-income countries (L and LM) accounted for 3% of the disputes against high-income 
countries during the GATT, that share has increased to 11% under the WTO. Under the 
GATT, there were just 19,2% (34 out of 177) of the disputes that were initiated by the lower-
income countries. That percentage shows an increase to 36.5% (200 out of 548) under the 
WTO. Under the GATT, high-income countries faced 92% of the total disputes. They faced 
162 disputes in total out of which 20% (33 out of 162) were initiated by the lower-income 
countries. That percentage remains the same under the WTO (65 out of 325). Under the 
GATT, the lower-income countries faced just 3,4% (6 out of 177) of the total disputes. Under 
the WTO, that number has increased to 101 cases out of 548, i.e., 18%. The total number of 
disputes initiated by the lower-income countries shows a marginal increase from 19.2% (34 
out of 177) to 19,3 % (106 out of 548). Nevertheless, if one considers the disputes filed by the 
UM countries, 18% of the disputes have been against the lower-income countries. 
  
 
32 There are some GATT disputes, for example, in 1992, when the United States imposition of countervailing duties on imports of fresh and 
chilled Atlantic salmon from Norway, the EEC reserved its right to present its views to the panel as an interested third-party. 
Table 1.5 Income status and participatory roles under the GATT and the WTO 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Income classification GATT until Dec. 
1994 
WTO until Dec 2016 without 
Third- party participation 
WTO until Dec 2016 with 
Third party participation 
H 26 (20.3%) 33(20.1%) 42 (25.6%) 
UM 12 (9.3%) 18(10.9%) 28 (17%) 
LM 4 (3.1%) 15(9.1%) 24 (14.6%) 
L 3 (2.3%) 1(0.6%) 8 (4.8%) 
Lower=L+LM 7 (5.4%) 16 (9.7%) 32 (19.4%) 
Total number countries participation 44 (34%) 67 (40.8%) 102 (62%) 
Total number of member countries 128 (100%) 164(100%) 164(100%) 
 
Table 1.6 Who complained against whom in light of the income status 
Panel A Table GATT  Income of the respondent GATT (% in parentheses)     
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
Income of the complainant 
GATT 
H UM LM L Total 
H 90 (51) 8 (5) 2 (1) 3 (2) 103 (58) 
UM 39 (22) 1 (1) 0 0 40 (23) 
LM 29 (16) 0 0 0 29 (16) 
L 4 (3) 0 0 1 (0.5) 5 (3) 
Lower income (L+LM) 33 (19) 0 0 1(0.5) 34 (19) 
Total 162(92) 9 (5) 2 (1) 4 (2) 177 (100) 
  
    
  
Panel B Table WTO Income of the respondent WTO(% in parentheses) 
 
  
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
Income of the complainant WTO  H UM LM L Total 
H 195 (36) 67 (12) 38 (7) 20 (3,6) 320 (58) 
UM 65 (11,8) 31 (5,6) 25 (4,6) 1 122 (22) 
LM 48 (8.7) 17 (3) 11 (2) 2(0.3) 78 (14) 
L 17 (3) 7 (1,2) 3 (5) 1(.18) 28 (5) 
Lower income (L+LM) 55(11.7) 24(4.2) 14 (7) 3 (0.5) 106(19) 




To provide a better idea about the contrast, take a look at Table 1.6.1. It provides 
similar information but classifies the disputants in terms of decile ranking of income. It can be 
seen that the lowest 30% of the members are hardly active as a complainant, but they have 
filed a dispute against the countries that belong to the the highest 20% . The members in the 
income category of the lowest 20% have not faced any disputes. 
 
 





3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
          
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 30 35 
4 0 0 2 0 2 4 11 35 54 
5 1 2 4 8 9 27 44 175 270 
6 0 2 5 6 10 31 54 146 254 
7 1 1 8 4 8 26 43 190 281 
8 4 3 17 11 21 58 92 484 690 
9 7 7 28 18 34 92 111 501 798 
10 19 19 95 
 
121 343 395 1,082 2,148 
Total 32 34 159 121 205 581 755 2,645 4,532 
1.3.3) Continent, contiguity and colonial relation between the disputants 
 
The number of low-income countries that are a member of the WTO differs per continent. All 
of the countries in North America are members of the WTO, and there is only one country 
that is categorized as a low-income country, viz. Haiti. The continent of Asia has six low-
income countries33 that are a member of the WTO while the continent of Africa has 25 WTO 
members that are categorized as such.  
Figure 1.1 shows that the number of active countries differs per continent. With 66% 
of the South-American members having participated actively in the DSU makes it the most 
active continent. Sixty two percent of the European members are active not only under the 
GATT but also under the WTO. The participation of Asian members has increased from 31% 
under the GATT to 40% during the WTO.  
Table 1.7 shows the continent wise representation of the countries as the complainants 
and the respondents. The first column shows the continent. The second and third columns 
show the total number complainants and the respondents under the GATT during the period 
from 1948 to 1994. The last two columns provide the same information for the WTO period 
from 1995 to 2016. It shows that, while the North American share of disputes has almost 
doubled under the WTO, the African complainants have yet to find their way in it. The share 
of Asian dispute initiators has gone up during the WTO era in comparison with the GATT era 
while the African continent has seen its share of respondents growing34.  






33 Asian low-income countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Nepal. African Low-income countries: Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, and 
Uganda. 
34 African respondents: Egypt, South Africa, and Morocco. 
Table 1.7. DSU participation at the continent level 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) 





complaints under WTO 
(until Dec 2016) 
respondents under 
WTO (until Dec 
2016) 
Africa 3 (1.7) 0 0 10 (1.8) 
Asia 8 (4) 15 (8.5) 132 (24) 139 (24) 
Oceania 5 (2.8) 2 (1) 119 (21.7) 15 (2.7) 
Europe 43 (24) 93 (53) 200 (36) 132 (24) 
North America 70 (39.5) 65 (37) 22 (4) 185 (33) 
South America 48 (27) 2 (1) 75 (13.6) 67 (12) 
Total 177 (100) 177 (100) 548 (100) 548 (100) 
(% in parentheses) 
        
(Source: Authors calculation) 
 
Table 1.8 draws attention to a high number of disputes between the non-contiguous 
bilateral pairs in relation to the total disputes. During the GATT period from 1948 to 1994, 
96,5% (710/735) of the bilateral disputes occurred between the non-contiguous countries. 
During the WTO period from 1995 to 2016, 97,2% (3884/3995) of the bilateral disputes took 
place between the non-contiguous countries. Furthermore, Table 1.8 shows that irrespective 
of the income status of the complainants, the high percentage of a non-contiguity 
characteristic remains between the disputants.  
Table 1.8. The contiguity of the bilateral disputants during 1948-2016 
Income classification of 
complainant GATT/WTO 
GATT (1948-1994)   WTO (1995-2016)   
  Non-Contiguous Contiguous Total Non-Contiguous Contiguous Total 
L 27 (96%) 1 28 134 (99%) 1 135 
LM 106 (99%) 1 107 458(98%) 7 465 
UM 125 (98%) 2 127 676(95%) 32 708 
H 452 (94%) 21 473 2616(97%) 71 2687 
Total 710 (97%) 25 735 3884(97%) 111 3995 
 
The next figure, Figure 1.3, shows that, irrespective of the era and the income level, the 
complainants have, in most of the cases, no colonial connection with the respondent country. 
Figure 1.3. Colonial connection between the disputants 
 
 
1.3.4) Economic integration  
Figure 1.4 is a pie chart that exhibits the extent of economic integration between the 
disputants. It illustrates that 73% of the bilateral pairs that have been disputants during the 
period under study have no economic agreement between them. Furthermore, it shows that, 
although the percentage of disputants with no economic agreement varies per income 
classification, most of the disputants have no economic agreement irrespective of the income 
classification of the complainant.  
 
1.3.5) Tariffs , political system and plurality 
For brevity reasons the results and figures related to Tariffs (Figure 1.5), political system 
(Figure 1.6) and plurality (Figure 1.7) are placed in the appendix 2.  
 
Summarizing, we have attempted to characterize the disputants during the GATT and 
the WTO with the help of various dimensions. To recap, Table 1.9 provides an overview of 









Table 1.9. Summary of main findings from tables and figures 
 
Figure/table Description Result GATT: 1948-1994 Result WTO: 1995-2016 
Table 1.2 Active participation rate (quadrant 2 
=active members/ total members) 
17.9 % (23 out of 128 members) 20.7 % (34 out of 164 members) 
Table 1.3 Inactive rate (Q4= non-active 
members/ total members) 
64.8 % (83 out of 128 members) 59.1 % (97 out of 164 members) 
Table 1.4 First four front runner countries USA, EU, Canada, Brazil Same as under the GATT 
Table 1.5 Income status and general 
participation of Lower income 
countries 
5.4% (7 out of 128 members)  9.7% (16 out of 164 members) 
Table 1.5 Total counties participation 
(including WTO third party) 
34% (44 countries out of 128 members) 62% (102 countries out of 164 members) 
Table 1.6 Who complained against whom: 
disputes by Lower income members 
as dispute initiators 
19,2% (34 out of 177 bilateral disputes ) 36.5% (200 out of 548 bilateral disputes)  
Table 1.7 Who complained against whom: 
Lower income members as 
respondents 
3,4% (6 out of 177 bilateral disputes with 
EU one entity)  
18% (101 out of 548 bilateral disputes) 
Figure 1.1 Continents and active members Asian members participation 31%  Asian members participation40% 
Table 1.7 Continents and complainants 3 African complainants No African dispute initiators 
Table 1.8 Contiguity and disputant pair  97% Non-Contiguous bilateral disputants Same as under the GATT 
Figure 1.1 Colonial connection and disputant 
pair  
Majority of the disputants no colonial 
connection 
Same as under the GATT 
Figure 1.2 Economic integration and disputant 
pair  
No economic agreement between 
disputants irrespective of the income 
classification of the complainant. 
Same as under the GATT 
Figure 1.3 Tariff rates and disputant pair  High-income complainants raise dispute 
against a country with an equal tariff 
High-income dispute initiators raise 
dispute against a country with a higher 
tariff 
Figure 1.4 Political system and complainant Lower income countries with 
presidential political system were the 
dispute initiators 
Low and high-income countries with 
parliamentary system initiate the dispute 
in majority cases 
Figure 1.5  plurality and complainant Lower income countries with non-
plurality were the dispute initiators 
Across all income classification, 
majority of complainants are plurality  
 
 
1.5) Discussion and Conclusion  
 
With the WTO being a member driven organization, the question addressed in this paper is 
fundamental for assessing the extent of inclusiveness of the WTO members in the DSU 
process. The paper answers the question related to the extent of participation of the members 
under the WTO with respect to its predecessor, the GATT, with reference to the income status 
of the member countries as the disputants during the period 1948-2016. The database consists 
of 725 initiated disputes comprising 4759 bilateral pairs. The paper uses descriptive 
techniques to present stylized features of the data on disputes which helps to ascertain the 
extent of participation of low-income countries.  
Based on the descriptive analysis, it can be concluded that the least developed members 
donot use the system. The idea of WTO a global public good needs to put some extra efforts 
to align the members belonging to lower-income countries. A few observations regarding the 
participation of the members are summed up as follows:  
• A marginal increase in the number of complaints by the lower-income countries under 
the WTO with respect to the GATT and yet the disputes against the lower-income 
countries have increased sharply under the WTO. 
• Widespread use of a third party role by low-income countries 
• The absence of African countries as dispute initiators during the WTO 
 
The WTO reiterated in 2012 in a report that “Developing countries should be encouraged to 
use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, … to ensure the continued good functioning of 
the system and to make it more effective and operational for them”. The establishment of the 
Advisory Council on WTO Law (ACWL) was a step to address this problem. The ACWL was 
established in 2001 with a mission to provide developing countries and less developed 
countries (LDCs) with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to take full advantage of 
the opportunities offered by the WTO. Hoekman et al. (2008) noted that the ACWL should 
have increased the participation of the developing countries, implying that the results were 
otherwise.  
Aim of ACWL35 is to provide free advice in all legal matters to the developing countries 
and it assists in dispute settlement proceedings at a reduced tariff. The role of ACWL 
becomes active only after a developing country to take initiative of dispute initiation. 
However, it should be noted that the decision of a dispute initiation can be taken only when a 
country identifies potential trade dispute. In other words, only when a member country 
identifies a breach of WTO law. The developing countries by definition have capacity 
constraint.  
 
As noted earlier by a few scholars, the capacity constraints of various types faced by 
developing countries may result in a fewer number of cases brought to the DSB by them 
(Hoekman, Bank, & Horn, 2008). Busch, Reinhardt, & Shaffer (2009) conducted a study 
among the WTO members to answer whether the members had relied on the services of the 
ACWL for legal representation. They concluded that the developing countries face twofold 
problems, i.e., one at the home front and another at Geneva. The problem at the home front 
occurs due to a lack of support from the home capital or lack of coordination between 
ministries in the home capital. The problem surfaces at Geneva in the form of lack of 
 
35 44 least developed countries are entitled to services of ACWL without becoming a member. Two third of the active developing countries , 
to be precise 36 countries, have become member of the ACWL( ACWL accessed January 10th from  https://www.acwl.ch/members-
introduction/. 
experience, expertise, personnel, and legal knowledge. A digitization process of filing dispute 
could be an answer to this where no physical presence in Geneva is required. 
 
An involvement in a dispute as a third party was expected to provide some experience in the 
WTO procedure. It would provide countries without experience an ability to practice the DSB 
procedure and to learn by observing so that the ‘third party countries today’ can actively 
participate as ‘complainant countries tomorrow’. The explicit and official role of a third 
party36 in the dispute process opens a new opportunity for participation. It is to be noted that, 
for a country to join as a third party member in a dispute requires official acceptance by the 
respondent. In the event of non-acceptance, third parties will receive the parties’ first written 
submissions and present their views orally to the panel during the first substantive meeting 
(Article 10.3 of the DSB). Third parties have no rights beyond these, although a panel can 
extend the rights of participation of third parties in individual cases. This may suggest re-
examining and redefining the role of these parties which may involve providing their 
members with some rights. These extended rights may prove to be useful for them to receive 
benefits from the panel ruling37. A decision of non-participation by developing countries may 
be to save their scarce resources; as for whether they are active or passive, the countries in the 
same income bracket face the same trade barriers abroad (Bermann & Mavroidis, 2007). 
There is a significant increase in the number of active members under the WTO, especially 
after considering the participation as a third party country. However, without considering the 
role of a third party, the results show that there is only a marginal increase in the participation 
of the lower-income members38. Enhanced third party rights are not automatically imbedded 
in the procedure but are provides on case to case basis, they cannot make additional claim. A 
amendment in this could go a long way to take that extra step from third-party to a claimant.  
 
The absence of African countries as complainants at the WTO contrasts with the GATT. 
Under the GATT, there were three different African countries, i.e., Malawi, South Africa, and 
 
36 A few cases in which the respondent was alleged to have offered excessive import protection relative to liberalization gains being extended 
to the complainant have also been extended to third country exporters, which is consistent with a functioning principle of equity embodied in 
the MFN rule (Bown, 2009) 
37 There is a difference between “substantial trade interest” that is required for third parties in consultations and “substantial interest” before 
the panel. Most significant is the fact that it is possible to join consultations only with the respondent’s acceptance (and, in the case of non-
acceptance, there is no recourse to enforce participation). On the other hand, any member who invokes a systemic interest, in practice, is 
admitted to a panel procedure as a third-party without any scrutiny whether the interest truly is “substantial” (WTO DSU process). 
38 As shown in Table 5, the income status and role under the GATT (1948-1994) and the WTO (1995-2016) in an earlier section, an increase 
from 35% under the GATT to 41% under the WTO. During 1995-2014, 5% of the disputes were initiated by the seven countries with an L38 
status. These countries are Bangladesh, Honduras India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nicaragua. The countries with an LM status 
accounted for 14% of the initiated disputes. During the GATT, the L and LM countries together launched 17% of the total 153 bilateral 
disputes. The countries with an L status that initiated disputes were, among others Cuba, Malawi, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe, that took an initiative to file a dispute39. In a survey by Laker (2013) among the 
African resident representatives in Geneva, it was pointed out that 55 % of the respondents 
mentioned that they had no legal capacity, and only ten of Africa’s resident representatives 
(44%) had legal capacities. The absence of Africa as a complainant could also partly be 
explained by the pact between the US and Africa. The African Growth and Opportunities Act 
(AGOA)40 reports that a few disputes have been resolved between the US and African 
countries, however, the records are not openly accessible.  
Out of 44 African members, as many as 18 countries have participated as a third party 
country in several disputes. The expectation that the third party role to function as a stepping 
stone to build the necessary expertise and capacity has not worked out to an extent to induce 
them to take a step ahead to initiate a dispute under the WTO. The lack of experience, 
expertise, and skills is not necessarily a valid argument for the absence at the DSU. The 
results show necessity to activate the poorer members of the WTO. The necessity of physical 
presence in Geneva may get reduced if the digitization process to file a dispute could be made 
available, where a member could file a dispute from its own capital city. Policy wise it can be 
concluded that an extended role of ACWL, enlargement of rights to third party for example as 
claimant, digitization could be a few suggestions to increase accessibility, keeping the 
members active to the relevant issues of the WTO. 
This analysis with the use of dimension in gravity model of bilateral trade shows that, in 
spite of the formalization of the DSU procedure, the dispute initiation shows some economic 
characteristics. This global public good shows that characteristics of an economic good, to be 
specific of normal good, whereby higher the income, higher utilization of good is observed. 
This by nature indicates exclusion of the developing and least-developed countries and needs 





39 All after post-independence era. Malawi vs US in 1967, South Africa 1985 vs Canada, and Zimbabwe, as one of the nine complainants vs 
US in1994. 
40 https://agoa.info.The AGOA is a United States Trade Act enacted on 18 May 2000 as Public Law 106 of the 200th Congress. The AGOA 
has since been renewed to 2025. As of December 2016, it is extended to 37 SSA countries, to 1,800 tariff line products in addition to 4600 
duty-fee products under the US Generalized system of preferences program (GSP) program. It includes import sensitive products like 
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Appendix 1: List of members with accession dates 
 
 
1 Afghanistan 29 July 2016 84 Liechtenstein 1 September 1995 (GATT: 29 March 1994)
2 Albania 8 September 2000 85 Lithuania 31 May 2001
3 Angola 23 November 1996 (GATT: 8 April 1994) 86 Luxembourg 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948)
4 Antigua and Barbuda 1 January 1995 (GATT: 30 March 1987) 87 Macao, China 1 January 1995 (GATT: 11 January 1991)
5 Argentina 1 January 1995 (GATT: 11 October 1967) 88 Madagascar 17 November 1995 (GATT: 30 September 1963)
6 Armenia 5 February 2003 89 Malawi 31 May 1995 (GATT: 28 August 1964)
7 Australia 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948) 90 Malaysia 1 January 1995 (GATT: 24 October 1957)
8 Austria 1 January 1995 (GATT: 19 October 1951) 91 Maldives 31 May 1995 (GATT: 19 April 1983)
9 Bahrain, Kingdom of 1 January 1995 (GATT: 13 December 1993) 92 Mali 31 May 1995 (GATT: 11 January 1993)
10 Bangladesh 1 January 1995 (GATT: 16 December 1972) 93 Malta 1 January 1995 (GATT: 17 November 1964)
11 Barbados 1 January 1995 (GATT: 15 February 1967) 94 Mauritania 31 May 1995 (GATT: 30 September 1963)
12 Belgium 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948) 95 Mauritius 1 January 1995 (GATT: 2 September 1970)
13 Belize 1 January 1995 (GATT: 7 October 1983) 96 Mexico 1 January 1995 (GATT: 24 August 1986)
14 Benin 22 February 1996 (GATT: 12 September 1963) 97 Moldova, Republic of 26 July 2001
15 Bolivia, Plurinational State of 12 September 1995 (GATT: 8 September 1990) 98 Mongolia 29 January 1997
16 Botswana 31 May 1995 (GATT: 28 August 1987) 99 Montenegro 29 April 2012
17 Brazil 1 January 1995 (GATT: 30 July 1948) 100 Morocco 1 January 1995 (GATT: 17 June 1987)
18 Brunei Darussalam 1 January 1995 (GATT: 9 December 1993) 101 Mozambique 26 August 1995 (GATT: 27 July 1992)
19 Bulgaria 1 December 1996 102 Myanmar 1 January 1995 (GATT: 29 July 1948)
20 Burkina Faso 3 June 1995 (GATT: 3 May 1963) 103 Namibia 1 January 1995 (GATT: 15 September 1992)
21 Burundi 23 July 1995 (GATT: 13 March 1965) 104 Nepal 23 April 2004
22 Cabo Verde 23 July 2008 105 Netherlands 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948)
23 Cambodia 13 October 2004 106 New Zealand 1 January 1995 (GATT: 30 July 1948)
24 Cameroon 13 December 1995 (GATT: 3 May 1963) 107 Nicaragua 3 September 1995 (GATT: 28 May 1950)
25 Canada 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948) 108 Niger 13 December 1996 (GATT: 31 December 1963)
26 Central African Republic 31 May 1995 (GATT: 3 May 1963) 109 Nigeria 1 January 1995 (GATT: 18 November 1960)
27 Chad 19 October 1996 (GATT: 12 July 1963) 110 Norway 1 January 1995 (GATT: 10 July 1948)
28 Chile 1 January 1995 (GATT: 16 March 1949) 111 Oman 9 November 2000
29 China 11 December 2001 112 Pakistan 1 January 1995 (GATT: 30 July 1948)
30 Colombia 30 April 1995 (GATT: 3 October 1981) 113 Panama 6 September 1997
31 Congo 27 March 1997 (GATT: 3 May 1963) 114 Papua New Guinea 9 June 1996 (GATT: 16 December 1994)
32 Costa Rica 1 January 1995 (GATT: 24 November 1990) 115 Paraguay 1 January 1995 (GATT: 6 January 1994)
33 Côte d'Ivoire 1 January 1995 (GATT: 31 December 1963) 116 Peru 1 January 1995 (GATT: 7 October 1951)
34 Croatia  30 November 2000 117 The Philippines 1 January 1995 (GATT: 27 December 1979)
35 Cuba 20 April 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948) 118 Poland 1 July 1995 (GATT: 18 October 1967)
36 Cyprus 30 July 1995 (GATT: 15 July 1963) 119 Portugal 1 January 1995 (GATT: 6 May 1962)
37 The Czech Republic 1 January 1995 (GATT: 15 April 1993) 120 Qatar 13 January 1996 (GATT: 7 April 1994)
38 The Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 January 1997 121 Romania 1 January 1995 (GATT: 14 November 1971)
39 Denmark 1 January 1995 (GATT: 28 May 1950) 122 Russian Federation 22 August 2012
40 Djibouti 31 May 1995 (GATT: 16 December 1994) 123 Rwanda 22 May 1996 (GATT: 1 January 1966)
41 Dominica 1 January 1995 (GATT: 20 April 1993) 124 Saint Kitts and Nevis 21 February 1996 (GATT: 24 March 1994)
42 Dominican Republic 9 March 1995 (GATT: 19 May 1950) 125 Saint Lucia 1 January 1995 (GATT: 13 April 1993)
43 Ecuador 21 January 1996 126 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 1 January 1995 (GATT: 18 May 1993)
44 Egypt 30 June 1995 (GATT: 9 May 1970) 127 Samoa 10 May 2012
45 El Salvador 7 May 1995 (GATT: 22 May 1991) 128 Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of 11 December 2005
46 Estonia 13 November 1999 129 Senegal 1 January 1995 (GATT: 27 September 1963)
47 European Union (formerly European Communities) 1 January 1995 130 Seychelles 26 April 2015
48 Fiji 14 January 1996 (GATT: 16 November 1993) 131 Sierra Leone 23 July 1995 (GATT: 19 May 1961)
49 Finland 1 January 1995 (GATT: 25 May 1950) 132 Singapore 1 January 1995 (GATT: 20 August 1973)
50 France 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948) 133 Slovak Republic 1 January 1995 (GATT: 15 April 1993)
51 Gabon 1 January 1995 (GATT: 3 May 1963) 134 Slovenia 30 July 1995 (GATT: 30 October 1994)
52 The Gambia  23 October 1996 (GATT: 22 February 1965) 135 Solomon Islands 26 July 1996 (GATT: 28 December 1994)
53 Georgia 14 June 2000 136 South Africa 1 January 1995 (GATT: 13 June 1948)
54 Germany 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 October 1951) 137 Spain 1 January 1995 (GATT: 29 August 1963)
55 Ghana 1 January 1995 (GATT: 17 October 1957) 138 Sri Lanka 1 January 1995 (GATT: 29 July 1948)
56 Greece 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 March 1950) 139 Suriname 1 January 1995 (GATT: 22 March 1978)
57 Grenada 22 February 1996 (GATT: 9 February 1994) 140 Swaziland (now eSwatini) 1 January 1995 (GATT: 8 February 1993)
58 Guatemala 21 July 1995 (GATT: 10 October 1991) 141 Sweden 1 January 1995 (GATT: 30 April 1950)
59 Guinea 25 October 1995 (GATT: 8 December 1994) 142 Switzerland 1 July 1995 (GATT: 1 August 1966)
60 Guinea-Bissau 31 May 1995 (GATT: 17 March 1994) 143 Chinese Taipei 1 January 2002
61 Guyana 1 January 1995 (GATT: 5 July 1966) 144 Tajikistan 2 March 2013
62 Haiti 30 January 1996 (GATT: 1 January 1950) 145 Tanzania 1 January 1995 (GATT: 9 December 1961)
63 Honduras 1 January 1995 (GATT: 10 April 1994) 146 Thailand 1 January 1995 (GATT: 20 November 1982)
64 Hong Kong, China 1 January 1995 (GATT: 23 April 1986) 147 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 4 April 2003
65 Hungary 1 January 1995 (GATT: 9 September 1973) 148 Togo 31 May 1995 (GATT: 20 March 1964)
66 Iceland 1 January 1995 (GATT: 21 April 1968) 149 Tonga 27 July 2007
67 India 1 January 1995 (GATT: 8 July 1948) 150 Trinidad and Tobago 1 March 1995 (GATT: 23 October 1962)
68 Indonesia 1 January 1995 (GATT: 24 February 1950) 151 Tunisia 29 March 1995 (GATT: 29 August 1990)
69 Ireland 1 January 1995 (GATT: 22 December 1967) 152 Turkey 26 March 1995 (GATT: 17 October 1951)
70 Israel 21 April 1995 (GATT: 5 July 1962) 153 Uganda 1 January 1995 (GATT: 23 October 1962)
71 Italy 1 January 1995 (GATT: 30 May 1950) 154 Ukraine 16 May 2008
72 Jamaica 9 March 1995 (GATT: 31 December 1963) 155 United Arab Emirates 10 April 1996 (GATT: 8 March 1994)
73 Japan 1 January 1995 (GATT: 10 September 1955) 156 The United Kingdom 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948)
74 Jordan 11 April 2000 157 The United States of America 1 January 1995 (GATT: 1 January 1948)
75 Kazakhstan 30 November 2015 158 Uruguay 1 January 1995 (GATT: 6 December 1953)
76 Kenya 1 January 1995 (GATT: 5 February 1964) 159 Vanuatu 24 August 2012
77 Korea, Republic of 1 January 1995 (GATT: 14 April 1967) 160 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 1 January 1995 (GATT: 31 August 1990)
78 Kuwait, the State of 1 January 1995 (GATT: 3 May 1963) 161 Vietnam 11 January 2007
79 Kyrgyz Republic 20 December 1998 162 Yemen 26 June 2014
80 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2 February 2013 163 Zambia 1 January 1995 (GATT: 10 February 1982)
81 Latvia 10 February 1999 164 Zimbabwe 5 March 1995 (GATT: 11 July 1948)
82 Lesotho 31 May 1995 (GATT: 8 January 1988) ( Source WTO website accessed April 2017)
83 Liberia — 14 July 2016
 
Appendix 2 : Results tariff, political system and plurality 
Figure 1.5 shows whether the level of simple weighted average tariff of the complainant 
country with respect to the respondent country is higher, lower, or equal to the respondent 
country. It exhibits that, under the GATT, 89,2% of the low-income countries that initiated a 
dispute had a higher tariff than that of a respondent. That percentage diminishes as one moves 
along the higher income category during the GATT period. The percentage of disputes against 
a lower-tariff country is seen to increase among all of the income categories of the 
complainants under the WTO. That percentage is as high as 97,7 for the low-income countries 
and, with 36,1 %, it is the lowest for the high-income countries.  






1.3.6) Political systems and plurality 
 
Figure 1.6 shows that, for the non-high-income countries, a presidential form of political 
system has contributed to most of the disputes. In the way that DPI (2015) defines political 
systems, the presidential form could be considered as the most non-democratic. For the high-
income complainants, the countries with a parliamentary system characterize the 
complainants during the GATT era. With the ushering in of the WTO era, the share of low-
income complainants with the parliamentary system has increased to 73% of the total dispute 
initiations by the low-income countries.  
Figure 1.6 also shows that, during the GATT, the dispute initiating lower-income 
member countries had a non-plural form of government. It indicates an absence of the 
influence of public opinion and pressure on the elected constituencies. Under the WTO, 
irrespective of income status, most of the cases are filed by member countries with a plurality 
form of government. However, the percentage of complainants with a plurality form of 
government diminishes as one moves to a higher income category from 97% for the low-
income complainants to 64% for the high-income countries. 
 




Figure 1.7. Plurality and the complainants 
 
 
 
  
 
 
